Improved logging. Reject mismatching keys on hash collision.
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c18997bf5b
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@ -234,6 +234,16 @@ class Identity:
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expected_hash = RNS.Identity.full_hash(hash_material)[:RNS.Reticulum.TRUNCATED_HASHLENGTH//8]
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if destination_hash == expected_hash:
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# Check if we already have a public key for this destination
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# and make sure the public key is not different.
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if destination_hash in Identity.known_destinations:
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if public_key != Identity.known_destinations[destination_hash][2]:
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# In reality, this should never occur, but in the odd case
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# that someone manages a hash collision, we reject the announce.
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RNS.log("Received announce with valid signature and destination hash, but announced public key does not match already known public key.", RNS.LOG_CRITICAL)
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RNS.log("This may indicate an attempt to modify network paths, or a random hash collision. The announce was rejected.", RNS.LOG_CRITICAL)
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return False
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RNS.Identity.remember(packet.get_hash(), destination_hash, public_key, app_data)
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del announced_identity
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@ -245,11 +255,11 @@ class Identity:
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return True
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else:
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RNS.log("Received invalid announce for "+RNS.prettyhexrep(destination_hash)+". Destination mismatch.", RNS.LOG_DEBUG)
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RNS.log("Received invalid announce for "+RNS.prettyhexrep(destination_hash)+": Destination mismatch.", RNS.LOG_DEBUG)
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return False
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else:
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RNS.log("Received invalid announce for "+RNS.prettyhexrep(destination_hash), RNS.LOG_DEBUG)
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RNS.log("Received invalid announce for "+RNS.prettyhexrep(destination_hash)+": Invalid signature.", RNS.LOG_DEBUG)
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del announced_identity
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return False
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