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Fix BLE pairing behaviour and disable just works pairing

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jacob.eva 2024-08-21 11:01:38 +01:00
parent 721cee3603
commit d7f2de07c0
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1 changed files with 43 additions and 11 deletions
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54
Bluetooth.h
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@ -259,9 +259,34 @@ void bt_disable_pairing() {
void bt_pairing_complete(uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t auth_status) {
if (auth_status == BLE_GAP_SEC_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
bt_state = BT_STATE_CONNECTED;
cable_state = CABLE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
bt_disable_pairing();
BLEConnection* connection = Bluefruit.Connection(conn_handle);
ble_gap_conn_sec_mode_t security = connection->getSecureMode();
// On the NRF52 it is not possible with the Arduino library to reject
// requests from devices with no IO capabilities, which would allow
// bypassing pin entry through pairing using the "just works" mode.
// Therefore, we must check the security level of the connection after
// pairing to ensure "just works" has not been used. If it has, we need
// to disconnect, unpair and delete any bonding information immediately.
// Settings on the SerialBT service should prevent unauthorised access to
// the serial port anyway, but this is still wise to do regardless.
//
// Note: It may be nice to have this done in the BLESecurity class in the
// future, but as it stands right now I'd have to fork the BSP to do
// that, which I don't fancy doing. Impact on security is likely minimal.
// Requires investigation.
if (security.sm == 1 && security.lv >= 3) {
bt_state = BT_STATE_CONNECTED;
cable_state = CABLE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
bt_disable_pairing();
} else {
if (connection->bonded()) {
connection->removeBondKey();
}
connection->disconnect();
}
} else {
bt_ssp_pin = 0;
}
@ -273,21 +298,21 @@ bool bt_passkey_callback(uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t const passkey[6], bool ma
bt_ssp_pin += ((int)passkey[i] - 48) * pow(10, 5-i);
}
kiss_indicate_btpin();
if (match_request) {
if (bt_allow_pairing) {
return true;
}
if (bt_allow_pairing) {
return true;
}
return false;
}
void bt_connect_callback(uint16_t conn_handle) {
bt_state = BT_STATE_CONNECTED;
cable_state = CABLE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
bt_state = BT_STATE_CONNECTED;
cable_state = CABLE_STATE_DISCONNECTED;
}
void bt_disconnect_callback(uint16_t conn_handle, uint8_t reason) {
bt_state = BT_STATE_ON;
if (reason != BLE_GAP_SEC_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
bt_state = BT_STATE_ON;
}
}
bool bt_setup_hw() {
@ -305,7 +330,14 @@ bool bt_setup_hw() {
Bluefruit.autoConnLed(false);
if (Bluefruit.begin()) {
Bluefruit.setTxPower(8); // Check bluefruit.h for supported values
Bluefruit.Security.setIOCaps(true, true, false);
Bluefruit.Security.setIOCaps(true, false, false); // display, yes; yes / no, no; keyboard, no
// This device is indeed capable of yes / no through the pairing mode
// being set, but I have chosen to set it thus to force the input of the
// pin on the device initiating the pairing. This prevents it from being
// paired with automatically by a hypothetical malicious device nearby
// without physical access to the RNode.
Bluefruit.Security.setMITM(true);
Bluefruit.Security.setPairPasskeyCallback(bt_passkey_callback);
Bluefruit.Periph.setConnectCallback(bt_connect_callback);
Bluefruit.Periph.setDisconnectCallback(bt_disconnect_callback);